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RHETORICAL TRACTION: DEFINITIONS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS INJUDICIAL  
OPINIONS ABOUT WILDERNESS ACCESS
Steve Schwarze*
Almost every spring for the past eight 
years, I m ade a phone call to Maryland in 
order to get into Minnesota. An office in 
M aryland houses the reservation system for 
the Boundary W aters Canoe Area W ilder­
ness, a one-million acre preserve in the 
northeastern tip of M innesota that is the 
most visited unit of the National Wilderness 
Preservation System. This office acts as a 
medium of and barrier to m y access to the 
W ilderness; it issues permits to groups of 
people wishing to enter the Boundary W a­
ters, and it limits the num ber of parties that 
may enter at a given point on a  particular 
day. Although the Wilderness is public land, 
I must first gain permission from a state in­
stitution to enter the Boundary Waters.
That perm it is only one of the keys 
needed to unlock the door to the Boundary 
W aters. I also must pass through a ranger 
station on the day I enter to confirm my 
perm it and ensure that I view a short video
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earlier version o f this essay was presented a t the 2000 
N ational C om m unication  A ssociation C onvention , 
Seattle, W A, T he au thor thanks Shiv G anesh, Sara 
H ayden , C hristine O ravec, E dw ard Schiappa, and  the 
anonym ous review ers for their helpful feedback on 
this essay.
about the wilderness ethic of “Leave No 
Trace.” Going into the wilderness does not 
mean merely entering a supposedly un­
tainted, uninhabited area; it requires that 
people interact with the environment in 
ways that the Forest Service has deemed 
appropriate. Indeed, my yearly trips to the 
Boundary W aters involve more than just 
packing up my gear and heading north; 
more than catching fish and making camp­
fires; more than escaping the sights and 
sounds of the city and relaxing in solitude. 
These trips require me to play by the rules 
set by the state. The rules and regulations, 
the permits and videos, all affect my sheer 
physical presence in the wilderness. Passing 
through the wilderness means passing 
through the state.
Wilderness, as it has come to be articu­
lated in the United States, is neither an in­
herent quality of the natural world, nor a 
state of mind. N or is it the cultural common- 
sense about wilderness, the dom inant mode 
of speaking and writing about wilderness. 
For better or worse, wilderness is a construc­
tion of state institutions. Although environ­
mentalists, philosophers and ethicists have 
written prolifically about the meaning of wil-
I.
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demess and its contradictions,1 scholars 
have given far less attention to the question 
of how these meanings and contradictions 
get resolved by governing institutions for the 
practical purpose of managing wilderness ar­
eas.2 This essay addresses that question by 
examining arguments produced by govern­
ing institutions that have a direct impact on 
the management and hum an experience of 
established wilderness areas. I take as my 
case studies the controversies concerning 
wilderness management in two areas: the 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness in 
M innesota and the wilderness portion of De­
nali National Park in Alaska.
Specifically, I focus my attention on jud i­
cial opinions that address the issue of m otor­
ized access to the Boundary W aters and De­
nali. I examine judicial opinions because 
they are texts by which state institutions pro­
vide tem porary resolutions of ongoing pub­
lic controversies. Especially in the last de­
cade, individuals and interest groups have 
engaged in several controversies in order to 
influence public policy regarding the use of 
trucks, off-road vehicles and snowmobiles as 
modes of access and recreation on federal 
lands, including wilderness areas.
Advocates of motorized use have ex­
ploited ambiguity in wilderness legislation 
and management plans to gain rhetorical 
traction for arguments about motorized use 
in certain areas of designated wilderness. 
These arguments often get lodged in the
1 A good starting point for understanding the philo­
sophical debates about the idea o f wilderness is the 
collection of essays edited b y j .  Baird Callicott and M i­
chael P. Nelson. M uch of the work in this collection is 
indebted to Roderick Nash’s intellectual history o f the 
idea of wilderness in the United States.
2 Both Michael McCloskey and M ark W oods analyze
the definition of wilderness in the 19GI W ilderness Act. 
Daniel R ohlf and Douglas L. H onnold interpret the legal 
framework of wilderness m anagem ent, assessing how 
the definition o f wilderness has been put to use in the 
m anagem ent of wilderness areas and the adjudication of 
lawsuits brought against the Forest Service. T he present 
essay extends the work of Rohlf and H onnold by exam ­
ining by analyzing legal argum ents about a recent issue 
in wilderness m anagement: m otorized access.
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courts, where ambiguities in policy get re­
solved by judicial opinions.
This essay demonstrates that judicial opin­
ions rely on two related types of argument to 
resolve ambiguities in wilderness policy: def­
initional arguments and institutional argu­
ments. Judicial opinions surrounding motor­
ized use employ definitional arguments in 
order to clarify ambiguous policy prescrip­
tions regarding wilderness management. 
However, these definitional arguments often 
get resolved through arguments about insti­
tutional authority. Decisions about which 
definition shall be accepted get supported by 
arguments about the specific governing insti­
tution that has authority to establish that def­
inition. In fact, ongoing philosophical de­
bates about the meaning of wilderness fade 
into the background as courts attem pt to fix 
definitional authority within a particular in­
stitution. W ithin the courts, then, institu­
tional arguments have primacy over defini­
tional arguments. Institutional arguments 
provide justification for the court’s resolution 
or deferral of definitional arguments.
Identifying these two types of argument 
and the relationship between them is useful 
for elaborating theories of rhetoric and argu­
mentation and for assessing rhetorical strat­
egies in current motorized use controversies. 
In terms of rhetorical theory, this essay con­
tributes to ongoing discussions about the 
characteristics and functions of definitions in 
processes of argumentation.3 It does so by 
specifying institutional arguments as a signif­
icant influence on definitions that get fixed as 
part of the policy process. Recent essays 
have identified other influences on defini­
tions, such as political and economic inter­
ests (Schiappa 1996), racist beliefs (McGee), 
and the ideology of normalcy (Titsworth).
3 As a  set o f case studies, this essay takes up the call of 
both Douglas W alton and David Zarefsky. They suggest 
that scholars studying the use o f definitions in public 
arguments engage in case studies, in order to “show how 
definitions are actually used in different contexts as ar­
gumentative moves.” (Walton 132).
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Scholars also have identified a variety of 
influences on the definitions of wilderness 
and related terms in public policy (Callicott 
and Nelson; Nash; Oelschlager). While both 
the argumentation literature and the wilder­
ness literature successfully discern forces that 
motivate particular definitions, the cases dis­
cussed in this essay point to another influ- 
ence-argum ents about institutional author- 
ity—that has little to do with the definitions 
themselves. That is, regardless of the beliefs 
and assumptions that might have contrib­
uted to definitions of “wilderness” or notions 
of what counts as an appropriate means of 
“access” to wilderness areas, the definitions 
that get fixed by judicial opinions are ulti­
mately justified by the courts through the use 
of arguments regarding institutional author­
ity. Thus, it is im portant for argumentation 
scholars to consider institutional arguments 
as yet another im portant influence on the 
resolution of definitional issues in policy ar­
guments.
Second, this essay contributes to scholar­
ship that explores institutional argument, es­
pecially in the realm of environmental issues 
(Doxtader; Peterson). It does so by  showing 
how arguments about institutional authority 
function to negotiate the legitimacy of gov­
erning institutions. As Erik D oxtader has 
claimed in his work on institutional argu­
ment, “Discussions of particular policy 
choices often affirm the general authority of 
institutional practices of reasoning and cod­
ify norms of public interest" (185). In the 
cases I examine, policy prescriptions about 
motorized access ultimately turn on arguments 
about institutional authority. By explaining 
and clarifying the relationship between insti­
tutional and definitional arguments, I intend 
to show how institutional arguments operate 
as a specific form of argument that not only 
shapes the concrete execution of public pol­
icy but also contributes in complex ways to 
the legitimation of state power.
To the extent that these arguments con­
tribute to the legitimation of state power,
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they also play an im portant role in the pro­
cesses of hegemony that have drawn the 
attention of several theorists and critics in 
communication studies. This points to a 
third theoretical contribution of the essay; it 
suggests that studies of hegemony could ben­
efit by accounting for the specific role that 
state rhetorics play in the process of consent 
formation. W hile many studies of hegemony 
have examined civil society rhetorics in or­
der to challenge the notion of a monolithic, 
univocal “dom inant ideology,” this turn to­
ward civil society has often neglected how 
state institutions contribute the hegemonic 
process. The motorized access cases show 
how institutional arguments intended to clar­
ify the authority of state institutions can si­
multaneously erode the legitimacy of those 
institutions. If the analysis of hegemony is 
concerned with the process of negotiating 
consent to the established order, then it is 
imperative to analyze the rhetorics by which 
the established order contributes to consent 
and dissent.
O n a more practical level, m y analysis can 
help critics and advocates assess arguments 
about motorized use on other public lands. 
Arguments about access in the Boundary 
W aters and Denali have re-emerged in other 
management controversies. The Interior D e­
partm ent’s proposed ban on snowmobiles in 
national parks is an especially salient exam­
ple of how arguments get taken up in new 
controversies. An Anchorage Daily News arti­
cle about a 1999 lawsuit over snowmobile 
regulations in Denali encapsulates this argu­
mentative move: “Both sides say the case 
could carry weight far beyond the borders of 
Denali. The debate has come to symbolize a 
much broader struggle over snowmachining 
in Alaska and in national parks across the 
country” (Komamitsky). Public arguments 
by advocates for motorized use provide clear 
evidence for such an assertion. Advocates 
have continued to pursue arguments about 
access during the process of developing the 
W inter Use Plan in Yellowstone and Grand
i.
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Teton National Parks, proposed off road ve­
hicle bans on other federal lands, and the 
Bureau of Land M anagement’s proposed 
National Off-Highway Vehicle Strategy. In 
the conclusion of the essay, I briefly discuss 
how m y analysis provides a useful point of 
departure for interpreting and intervening in 
other management controversies.
The essay is divided into three major-sec­
tions. In the first two sections, I analyze the 
judicial opinions in the Boundary W aters 
and Denali controversies. I introduce each of 
these sections by contextualizing the contro­
versies in relation to the ambiguous terms of 
federal wilderness policy. In the analysis, I 
explain how the ambiguity of key terms such 
as “wilderness,” “feasible” means of “ac­
cess,” and “traditional activities” allow advo­
cates to gain rhetorical traction for their po­
sitions; but ultimately, the courts resolve 
these ambiguities through arguments about 
institutional authority. In the third section, I 
expand on the theoretical and practical im ­
plications suggested above.
D e f in in g  “ F e a sib l e ” : T h e  C a s e  
o f  t h e  B o u n d a r y  W a t e r s
The issue of motorized portages has been 
at the heart of the ongoing management con­
troversies in the Boundary W aters Canoe 
Area Wilderness. Travel from one lake to 
another in the Boundary W aters often in­
volves portaging canoes and equipment 
around rapids and other impasses. Although 
most portages force travelers to carry their 
gear across footpaths from one body of water 
to the next, a few of the longer and more 
rugged portages have been developed as m e­
chanical portages. Initially used for logging 
operations in the early part of the 20th cen­
tury (Proescholdt 46-47), these mechanical 
portages have since been staffed by private 
truck operators who help travelers load gear, 
boats and canoes onto flatbed trucks and 
then transport the gear over portages to the 
next lake or river. These portages have long
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been a point of dispute between wilderness 
preservation groups and local interest 
groups. W ilderness groups (in particular, the 
Friends of the Boundary Waters) have 
sought to eliminate the portages and argue 
persistently against exceptions and loop­
holes in the Wilderness Act of 1964 and the 
Boundary W aters Act of 1978 that allow 
forms of motorized travel in the Boundary 
Waters. O ther local interest groups (such as 
Conservationists with Com m on Sense) have 
defended motorized modes of travel as his­
torically accepted patterns of use on certain 
lakes and portages and have argued that 
these patterns have been codified in federal 
legislation.
The voices from these groups, however, 
must also contend with the voice of Con­
gress and the Forest Service, the agency with 
m anagem ent responsibility for the Boundary 
Waters. Although Congress mandated the 
elimination of nearly all mechanized forms 
of travel with the passage of the Wilderness 
Act and the Boundary W aters Act, a clause 
in the Boundary W aters Act kept three m o­
torized portages open until January  1, 1984. 
The Act m andated closure of these portages 
unless the Forest Service found “no feasible 
nonmotorized means of transporting boats 
across the portages” (Boundary W aters Act, 
Section 4(f)).
The ambiguity of the term “feasible” in 
this clause provided rhetorical traction for 
advocates, sustaining the controversy well 
beyond the 1984 deadline and resulting in 
two judicial opinions in the early 1990s that 
I will analyze in this section of the essay. 
Initially, the Forest Service declared that on 
the basis of their field trials, there was no 
feasible alternative to motorized portages, 
thus keeping the three portages motorized. 
Wilderness preservation groups fought this 
decision (among others) through the adm in­
istrative appeals process, but failed to 
achieve closure of those portages. Finally, in 
January  1990 wilderness groups brought ac­
tion in federal district court to overturn the
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Forest Service’s decision. In 1991, the Dis­
trict Court upheld the Forest Service, but in 
1992, the Appeals Court reversed that deci­
sion (Friends o f the Boundary Waters Wilderness 
v. Robertson, 1991 and 1992). The Supreme 
Court refused to hear a subsequent appeal 
brought by local interest groups. In  both the 
District Court decision and the Appeals 
Court reversal, the crux of the opinions was 
the judicial interpretation of the term “feasi­
ble.”
T h e D istrict Court O p in ion
The plaintiffs in the District Court case, 
wilderness preservation groups, claimed that 
there is a “feasible” means of boat transpor­
tation: portage wheels. Based on their own 
tests as well as those performed by the Forest 
Service, preservationist groups claimed it is 
possible (therefore, in their view, “feasible”) 
for travelers to use these wheels to assist 
human-powered transportation across por­
tages. The preservationists sought judicial re­
view of the agency’s decision because, in 
their view, the decision to maintain the m o­
torized portages violated the Boundary W a­
ters Act, the Wilderness Act, and “the obli­
gation delegated to [the Forest Service 
Chief] by Congress to manage the Boundary 
W aters with a presumption in favor of wil­
derness values” (Friends v. Robertson, 1991, 
1388-1389).
The defendants, the United States Forest 
Service, argued that the Court should “defer 
to the administrative finding of nonfeasibil­
ity,” since the Boundary W aters Act “leaves 
this decision to the Chief of the Forest Ser­
vice” (1389). There are two significant ele­
ments to this argument, one definitional and 
the other institutional. First, the Forest Ser­
vice claims that no nonmotorized means of 
transportation fits the definition of “feasible.” 
As evidence, they offer results of their field 
studies that show how transporting boats 
physically generated significant health and 
safety risks. Given this evidence, the Forest
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Service suggests that physically transporting 
equipment over portages does not fall under 
the definition of “feasible.” Second, this def­
initional argument works hand in hand with 
an institutional argument about the appro­
priate authority for determining this defini­
tion. The Forest Service claims that Con­
gress delegated decisions about “feasible” 
transportation to the agency; therefore, the 
Forest Service’s decision should not be a 
matter for legal dispute. Thus, the argument 
of the Forest Service hinges both on a defi­
nition of “feasible” as well as a determination 
of which governing institution has the au­
thority to define the term.
The first part of the court’s opinion shows 
how these institutional and definitional ques­
tions are intertwined. To judge the compet­
ing definitional claims, the District Court 
turns to the Administrative Procedures Act 
(APA) and a series of precedent cases to 
provide the appropriate scope for their re­
view. This results in the court articulating the 
doctrine of “substitute judgm ent,” which lim­
its the institutional authority of the court: 
“Although this inquiry into the facts is to be 
searching and careful, the ultimate standard 
of review is a narrow one. The court is not 
empowered to substitute its judgm ent for 
that of the agency” (1389). This limitation on 
the court’s authority marks an important in­
stitutional influence on the definition of “fea­
sible.” The APA provides parameters for ju ­
dicial review of agency decisions, and makes 
clear that while the court must “consider 
whether the decision was based on a consid­
eration of the relevant factors and whether 
there has been a clear error of judgm ent,” it 
cannot replace the agency’s decision with its 
own judgment.
However, the court does have the author­
ity to interpret statutes; thus, the court’s def­
initions of statutory terms and phrases have 
authority in the development of manage­
ment policy. In this opinion, the court en­
gages almost exclusively in definitional argu­
ments to support their opinion. As the court
I
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puts it, “This case ultimately turns on the 
meaning of ‘feasible’ as used in the BWCAW 
Act” (1390). To generate this definition, the 
court turns to a Supreme Court decision, 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, which exam ­
ined the use of the word “feasible” in a case 
about building a highway through a city 
park. However, the court asserts that the 
Overton Park case is not a “direct analogue” to 
the Boundary W aters case, and so they do 
not simply use the definition of “feasible” 
from Overton Park. Rather, the court says that 
in Overton Park the Supreme Court consid­
ered the definition of “feasible” within the 
context of that particular park. So, the Dis­
trict Court proceeds by constructing the con­
text of “wilderness” in order to define feasi­
bility within the Boundary Waters.
This strategy of contextualization requires 
the court to make a definitional argument 
about the meaning of “wilderness.” How­
ever, the court’s interpretation of the statu­
tory language regarding “wilderness” also al­
lows the court to develop a questionable 
position regarding “access” as a fundamental 
purpose of wilderness management. Invok­
ing the definition of wilderness used in the 
1964 W ilderness Act, the court claims that 
the words of the act “ring hollow if this 
carefully protected wilderness is without hu­
man appreciators” (1390). W ith this asser­
tion, the court sets up a logic of balancing 
that they believe underlies wilderness pro­
tection. The court says that the Boundary 
W aters Act “seeks to balance protections of 
wilderness with public access to that wilder­
ness” (1391). In this logic, the desire for a 
protected wilderness m ust be balanced with 
the desire for an accessible wilderness that 
can be appreciated by hum an beings.
This balancing act is based on two ques­
tionable rhetorical moves. First, the court 
positions access and preservation as equally 
important policy objectives, even though the 
term “access” appears nowhere in the Wil­
derness Act. Through this positioning, the 
court creates an obligation (insuring access
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for all) that is not stated in the statutory 
definition of wilderness. Framing wilderness 
management in terms of these allegedly 
equal objectives makes it easier for the court 
to refute arguments for limiting access. Sec­
ond, the court tries to emphasize the impor­
tance of access by describing a hypothetical 
situation of a wilderness so strictly “pre­
served” that it would be “without human 
appreciators.” This is a red herring: the situ­
ation is neither what the management plan 
proposes, nor what the Wilderness Act 
states. The plan does not prohibit access or 
prevent appreciation; it merely limits the type 
o f transportation one may use in specific areas. 
Further, the Act explicitly requires wilder­
ness areas to provide “outstanding opportu­
nities for solitude or a primitive and uncon­
fined type of recreation” (Section 2(c)). 
Overall, then, the District Court’s opinion 
invokes a version of “wilderness” that pre­
sents wilderness m anagem ent as the out­
come of a precarious balancing act between 
preservation and access. While this balanc­
ing act may help the court argue against 
further regulation of access in the Boundary 
Waters, it poses a false dilemma that ignores 
the parts of the statute and the proposed 
management plan that give primacy to pro­
tecting the wilderness.
Nonetheless, after defining access as a fun­
damental goal of the Wilderness Act, the 
court proceeds to interpret the Boundary 
W aters Act in light of this goal. In effect, the 
court’s opinion defines “feasible” in a way 
that favors access over preservation. To de­
velop this definition, the court makes two 
arguments about how a ban on motorized 
access would subvert Congress’s intent in 
including the term “feasible” in the Act. 
First, Congress obviously could not have in­
tended “feasible” to function as producing a 
universal ban on motorized access, since the 
Boundary W aters Act contains language that 
does ban other motorized portages. Had 
Congress intended a universal ban, the court 
argues, they could have written that into the
137
ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY
law instead of providing a clause allowing 
for access alternatives. Second, the legisla­
tive history of the Boundary W aters Act also 
precludes a universal ban on motorized ac­
cess. Since the Act clearly accommodated 
competing interests regarding wilderness, 
and since earlier versions of the bill argued 
for a complete ban on motorized access, the 
feasibility criterion could not have been in­
tended to require complete elimination of 
the motorized portages. However, these two 
arguments suggest only that the feasibility 
criterion cannot be interpreted as requiring 
an absolute ban. They leave open the possi­
bility that motorized portages could be elim­
inated, unless the Forest Service determined 
that there was no feasible alternative.
Importantly, the latter phrase emphasizes 
that the Forest Service ultimately has the 
institutional authority to define “feasible.” 
T he District Court’s opinion simply uses a 
series of definitional arguments to declare 
the Forest Service’s definitions and decision 
to be reasonable. Referring to the definition 
articulated by the Forest Chief, the court 
states, “M ore fundamentally, ‘feasible,’ as 
used in the context of a wilderness which is
to be available to the general citizenry is
m ore properly thought of as ‘reasonably 
convenient or usable’” (1392). The court 
goes on to concur with the C hiefs decision 
in a way consistent with their earlier con­
cerns about access: “H ere the Chief, and this 
Court, must focus on matters of hum an ca­
pabilities in conjunction with citizen access 
to a managed wilderness. W hen viewed in 
this light, the Court concludes that the Chiefs 
decision is in accord with the BW CAW  Act, 
the Wilderness Act, and prudent wilderness 
management” (1392). In the end, an argu­
m ent about institutional authority, coupled 
with questionable definitional arguments re­
garding “access,” resolves the issue in favor 
of the Forest Service decision to maintain the 
motorized portages.
While the District Court opinion relies 
primarily on a series of definitional argu­
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ments, the Appeals Court focuses more on 
the institutional context of particular defini­
tions. The Appeals Court intends to elimi­
nate contention over definitions by devoting 
much of their opinion to determing which 
institution’s definition should be authorita­
tive in this situation. Thus, institutional argu­
ments move into the foreground.
T he A ppeals Court O pin ion
In reversing the District Court decision, 
the Appeals C ourt develops a much more 
succinct argument about the definition of 
feasibility. It argues that the definition of 
“feasible” is clear when considered in rela­
tion to the congressional intent of the Bound­
ary W aters Act. This turn of the argum ent to 
Congressional intent is enabled by the 
court’s use of Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council as a precedent case 
providing the standard for review. In Chev­
ron, the Supreme C ourt argued that judicial 
review of agency action must determine first 
whether the intent of Congress is clear. If the 
Appeals Court can show that the intent of 
the Act is clear, then it does not need to 
engage in a detailed analysis of the legislative 
history and compromises that went into the 
Act, and it can dismiss attempts by the 
agency to redefine key terms.
The court cites specific statutory language 
from the Boundary W aters Act to argue that 
Congress’s intent is clear. The opinion states 
that the Act explicitly includes “preventing: 
‘further road and commercial development 
and restoring natural conditions to existing 
temporary roads in the wilderness.’ Al­
though some motorboats are allowed on the 
lakes in issue, it is evident that congressional 
intent was to discourage motorized uses” 
(Friends v. Robertson, 1992, 1487). Given this 
purpose of the Act, the court rejects the no­
tion that feasible is an ambiguous word in 
the statute:
T h e  C h ie fs  decision , as effectuated b y  th e  district 
court’s ru ling , as well as th e  d issent, read s in to  the
138
RHETORICAL TRACTION
statute an  am bigu ity  w hich  does n o t exist. In  ap p ly ­
ing  the  clearly  expressed  in ten t o f  C ongress, w e can  
on ly  conclude  that ‘feasible’ m eans ‘capab le  o f  be ing  
do n e’ o r  ‘physically  possib le,’ an d  as a  m atte r o f  law, 
th e  C h ie f e rre d  in o rd erin g  th a t th e  portages rem ain  
op en  (1488).
O n this basis, the court claims that closing 
motorized portages “is consistent with the 
Act;” allowing some portages to rem ain m o­
torized is merely “an exception to a clearly 
expressed m andate” (1487).
Thus, in contrast to the District Court’s 
assertion of ambiguity in the term “feasible,” 
the Appeals Court eliminates ambiguity by 
situating the term within the context of a 
clear institutional m andate: motorized uses 
in wilderness areas are to be discouraged. 
For both courts, then, arguments about the 
definition of “feasible” get resolved through 
arguments about which institution’s defini­
tions have authority in a  particular instance. 
Here, institutional mandates articulated by 
Congress in the Wilderness Act and Bound­
ary W aters Act provide the grounds for the 
court’s argument. Congress, rather than the 
Forest Service, is the appropriate institu­
tional authority regarding this definition.
The argument for clear Congressional in­
tent, however, gets criticized in the dissent­
ing opinion written by Judge Magill. In his 
view, the court “has blindly adopted the def­
inition of ‘feasible’ from other statutes with­
out considering w hether Congress intended 
to adopt that definition” (1490). Yet it is 
arguable that the majority opinion does so. 
The majority opinion finds that the purposes 
of the Boundary W aters Act itself are clear, 
and then derives the meaning of “feasible” 
from these purposes. In addition, the major­
ity opinion invokes the definition of wilder­
ness found in the Wilderness Act and then 
infers that prohibiting motorized portages is 
“entirely consistent with the purposes an­
nounced in these Acts” (1487). So, the defi­
nition of feasible in the majority opinion 
depends on accepting the meaning of feasi­
ble within the context of the Boundary W a­
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ters and Wilderness Acts, not blindly adopt­
ing a definition stripped from another 
context.
Although Magill’s opinion ultimately did 
not win the day, his dissent reinforces my 
point that arguments about institutional au­
thority are a crucial means for resolving ar­
guments about definitions. For Magill, the 
majority’s decision violates the institutional 
authority that has been delegated to the For­
est Service; in his view, it is inappropriate for 
the court to engage in definitional arguments 
that have the effect of dictating policy to the 
agency. H e argues that Congress could have 
clearly stated that they wanted the portages 
terminated in 1984, but by leaving the pas­
sage ambiguous they delegated this respon­
sibility to the Forest Service. “Instead, Con­
gress directed an executive agency to 
interpret an ambiguous statutory term and to 
determine at the end of the six-year period 
whether the portages should remain open” 
(1491). Magill asserts that this direction must 
not be taken lightly, since it is crucial in 
maintaining proper relationships between 
branches of government and promoting re­
sponsive government.
Because C ongress d id  n o t explicitly  define ‘feasible 
nonm oto rized  m eans ,’ I w ould  defer to  th e  Forest 
Service’s reasonab le  decision. T h is conclusion  does 
n o t im ply  a  lack  o f  respec t for the  legislative b ranch ; 
instead , I believe it fosters respect. If  C ongress clearly 
directs, w e ju dges will follow . H ere , how ever, it a p ­
pears th a t C ongress d ecided  n o t to d ecide  the  status 
o f  these portages, an d  left th a t decision  to the  agency. 
By deferring  to  th e  agency, w e respec t th a t congres­
sional decision. M oreover, b y  leaving policy  deci­
sions to  th e  politically  accoun tab le  agencies rather 
th an  th e  ju d ic iary , w e foster d em ocratic  accountab il­
ity  (1493).
Magill’s argument explicitly reveals the ten­
sions between institutional authority and def­
initional arguments. Definitions that have 
the force of law are not determined merely 
by the best scientific, political, or ecological 
argument; they are produced within institu­
tional contexts. Thus, resolving definitional 
questions not only requires arguments about
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the definitions themselves; it also requires 
arguments about institutional authority over 
those definitions.
Empowering definitions, then, has as 
much to do with determining whose defini­
tion counts as with generating a persuasive 
definition. This relationship between defini­
tional and institutional arguments leads us to 
consider the complexities behind Schiappa’s 
assertion that “the only definitions of conse­
quence are those that have been empowered 
through persuasion or coercion” (1996,209). 
In the Boundary W aters cases, definitions 
are empowered in part by means of persua­
sion but ultimately by means of coercion. 
Both the District Court and the Appeals 
Court use a series of definitional arguments 
to persuade audiences that a particular defi­
nition of a term is reasonable. W hen the 
courts argue that these definitions ultimately 
are to be determined by a specific governing 
institution, however, they invoke the coer­
cive power of the state to empower that in­
stitution’s definitions as authoritative.
But the issue of whose definition counts 
raises another issue that affects the empow­
erm ent of a definition. In  particular, I con­
tend that in the realm of public policy, the 
empowerment of a definition is dependent 
on the legitimacy of the institution authorized 
to define the term, in addition to the dim en­
sions of persuasion and coercion noted by 
Schiappa. (While legitimacy is a product of 
persuasion, it is analytically separate from 
persuasion about the definition itself.) A def­
inition will not be empowered if the institu­
tion authorized to define it is not seen as 
legitimate. So, even when a court invokes 
the coercive power of the state to back an 
institution’s definition, their focus on who 
should define rather than what the definition 
should be foregrounds the legitimacy or sta­
tus of that institution in the eyes of public 
advocates.
For example, when the District Court sup­
ported the Forest Service definition of “fea­
sible,” public criticism emerged in part be­
SCHWARZE
cause the Forest Service was not seen as a 
legitimate public agency by a significant set 
of advocates. Preservation advocates felt that 
the Forest Service had shut them  out of de­
cision-making and had failed to follow the 
spirit of wilderness legislation in managing 
the area. Given this view of the agency, the 
District Court’s deferral to the Forest Service 
did not successfully empower the definition 
of “feasible,” in spite of the court’s consider­
able efforts to persuade audiences that the 
definition was reasonable. Thus, preserva­
tion advocates appealed the District Court’s 
decision.
The Boundary Waters case, then, suggests 
that neither persuasion nor coercion is suffi­
cient to empower a definition. As arguments 
about institutional authority defer defini­
tional questions to other institutions, those 
definitions may not be fully empowered if 
those institutions are not seen as legitimate. 
An im portant effect of arguments about in­
stitutional authority, then, is that they can 
revive larger questions about the legitimacy 
of specific governing institutions. W e will see 
further evidence of this in arguments in the 
controversy over snowmobile use in Denali 
National Park. As in the Boundary Waters, 
the issue of motorized access to wilderness is 
at the heart of the controversy. And, as in the 
Boundary Waters, arguments about this is­
sue ultimately turn toward arguments about 
which institution has authority to fix defini­
tions for the practiced purpose of manage­
ment.
D e f in in g  “ A c c e ss”  a n d  
“ T r a d it io n a l  A c t iv it ie s” : 
T h e  C a s e  o f  D e n a l i
The use of snowmobiles in Denali Na­
tional Park has emerged as a public issue for 
two main reasons. First, snowmobile access 
has generated controversy because the pop­
ularity of snowmobiling has rapidly in­
creased in the past decade. Consequently, 
private snowmobile associations and snow­
1
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mobile manufacturers have become identifi­
able, active groups interested in influencing 
park management policies. Second, the in­
creasing popularity of snowmobiling has led 
to more use of the park by snowmobilers, 
but the National Park Service has articulated 
unclear policies and exercised inconsistent 
enforcement regarding snowmobile opera­
tion in Denali. As with the Boundary W a­
ters, the legislation designating wilderness 
areas inside the park contains ambiguous 
terms that provide the grounds for compet­
ing arguments about motorized access.
The Alaska National Interest Lands Con­
servation Act, or ANILCA, is the main 
source of ambiguity about motorized access. 
In 1980, Congress passed ANILCA and ef­
fectively divided Denali into two main areas; 
the “Old Park,” approximately two million 
acres formerly called Mt. McKinley National 
Park, and another four million-acre area sur­
rounding the O ld Park. Nearly all of the Old 
Park is now managed as wilderness. How­
ever, ANILCA allows motorized uses in a 
portion of the wilderness under certain cir­
cumstances. Section 811 of ANILCA states 
that the Secretary of the Interior shall permit 
use of snowmobiles, motorboats and other 
means of surface transportation by local res­
idents for “subsistence uses.” In addition, 
section 1110(a) allows the use of snowma- 
chines and other modes of motorized trans­
portation in the park for “traditional activi­
ties” and “travel to and from villages and 
homesites.” So, although the Wilderness Act 
prohibits motorized uses, ANILCA pro­
vided an exception in the case of use for 
traditional activities and access to private 
holdings. The phrase “traditional activities” 
did not get defined in the legislation, how­
ever, and this source of ambiguity provides 
rhetorical traction for an array of arguments 
'about snowmobile access.
In addition to this definitional problem, 
ANILCA also is a source of ambiguity re­
garding institutional authority over m otor­
ized use. Again, section 1110(a) provides the
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relevant passage describing agency discre­
tion in managing motorized access:
Such use shall be  subject to reasonab le  regulations by  
the  Secretary  to p ro tec t the  natura l an d  o th er values 
o f  the  conservation  system  units, na tional recreation  
areas, an d  national conservation  areas, an d  shall n o t 
be  p roh ib ited  unless, after notice an d  h earin g  in the 
vicinity  o f  th e  affected un it o r  area, the  Secretary 
finds th a t such use w ould  b e  detrim enta l to the re ­
source values o f  the  un it o r  area.
This passage suggests that institutional au­
thority to regulate motorized use ultimately 
lies with the Secretary of the Interior. How­
ever, advocates for motorized use challenge 
this position, arguing that Congress estab­
lished a clear rationale for motorized access 
in ANILCA. Thus, a second line of argu­
ment about access emerges regarding which 
institution’s definitions should determine the 
extent of motorized access.
These definitional and institutional argu­
ments coalesced when the Denali Park Su­
perintendent issued temporary regulations 
in N ovem ber 1998 and February 1999 that 
banned snowmobile use in the O ld Park. 
The Alaska State Snowmobile Association 
took the Park Service to court, and in N o­
vem ber 1999 the District Court remanded 
the decision to the Park Service. In this sec­
tion of the essay, I will briefly examine pub­
lic advocacy by the ASSA and the Park Ser­
vice about those regulations before turning 
to the District Court’s opinion. I draw atten­
tion to the public advocacy in this contro­
versy since those texts illustrate how easily 
the definitional arguments about access turn 
into arguments about institutional authority, 
even outside the judicial arena. Then, as in 
the Boundary Waters example, I show how 
the court opinion resolves those definitional 
arguments by way of institutional arguments.
In itia l P ublic A rgum ents
The definitional arguments of the Na­
tional Park Service (NPS) and the Alaska 
State Snowmobile Association (ASSA) at­
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tem pt to establish what counts as permissible 
access by showing how their position main­
tains continuity in policies regarding access. 
For the snowmobile group, motorized access 
has been a consistent feature of the O ld Park. 
In the first paragraph of a 1997 article in 
Alaskan Snow Rider entidcd, “Denali Park Ac­
cess: Next M ajor Issue Facing Snowmobil­
ers,” ASSA Access Chair Jo e  Gauna writes, 
“Buses were taking people into the park as 
early as the 1920s and a hotel and visitor 
center was operated by the Alaska Railroad, 
the only reasonable access other than the 
primitive Denali Highway.” H e goes on to 
state that gradually, snowmobiles became 
part of motorized use as well, but the num ­
ber of users was small and did not present a 
significant problem. Then in 1980, ANILCA 
made special provisions for motorized access 
to the wilderness portion of the park: “To 
insure continued access, Congress specifi­
cally addressed snowmobiles, motorboats 
and airplanes in ANILCA, affirming the 
right to use them, even in ‘backcountry.’ ” 
For the ASSA, this claim is central to their 
argument that the O ld Park should be open 
to snowmobile use. ANILCA provides the 
most recent legislative precedent for snow­
mobile access, and points to Congress as the 
institution with prim ary authority over that 
access.
However, this argument overgeneralizes 
the meaning of access as described in 
ANILCA. The ASSA article asserts that cit­
izens have a broad right to motorized access, 
but it does not address ANILCA’s limita­
tions on that right. Specifically, the article 
ignores the fact that snowmobile access is 
limited; they are only to be used in conjunc­
tion with traditional activities such as hunt­
ing. ANILCA articulates a clear relationship 
between snowmobile use and other activi­
ties: In the Old Park, snowmachine use must 
be instrumental; it is a  means for pursuing 
other activities, not an end in itself. The 
ASSA’s argument, then, overgeneralizes this 
limited sense of access when it claims that
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ANILCA allows motorized access. Only 
through this overgeneralization can they 
maintain their argument about a history of 
continuous motorized access.
In contrast, National Park Service press 
releases build the case that prohibiting snow­
mobiles in the O ld Park provides continuity 
in policies regarding access. For example, a 
November 1998 press release claims that the 
regulations are a “continued closure” of the 
Old Park, and that traditional snowmachine 
use “was not allowed in the former M ount 
McKinley National Park” (National Park 
Service, “Snowmachine”). Further, the NPS 
argues that motorized use of the area prior to 
ANILCA also was illegal: “Recreational use 
of snowmachines in the former M ount M c­
Kinley National Park was neither customary 
or [sic] traditional, and was, in fact prohib­
ited by regulation.” A February 1999 press 
release also emphasizes continuity by point­
ing to specific sections of ANILCA: “In the 
former M ount McKinley National Park, 
there was no history of authorized general 
public snowmobile use for any activity, tra­
ditional or otherwise. The enactment of sec­
tion 1110(a) of ANILCA left this general 
prohibition of snowmobile use in the old 
park area intact unless the snowmobile use 
was for the purpose of conducting a ‘tradi­
tional activity’ ” (National Park Service, 
“Portion"). Taken together, these claims de­
pict an O ld Park from which snowmachines 
have always been banned, thus suggesting 
that the NPA has maintained a continuous 
policy regarding motorized access.
These competing arguments about continu­
ity of policy regarding access are grounded 
in appeals to institutional authority. Argu­
ments about institutional authority dominate 
the discussion of motorized access in Denali. 
Specifically, decisions about snowmobile ac­
cess turn on arguments about which institu­
tion has authority on this issue. As the con­
troversy moves toward the judicial arena, the 
ASSA and the NPS (as well as the W ilder­
ness Society, an intervenor in the suit) all
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attempt to articulate their substantive posi­
tions on m anagem ent in terms of the appro­
priate institutional decision-maker.
The ASSA, for example, questions whether 
the park superintendent has authority to en­
act regulations against snowmobile use. In 
the ASSA’s Novem ber 1997 article, Gauna 
hints that the superintendent’s authority over 
snowmobile use is limited. H e claims that 
Park Superintendent Steve M artin has taken 
a definite position for keeping the O ld Park 
motor free and that Martin is pursuing his 
personal preference rather than being ac­
countable to requirements and regulations. 
“[The superintendent] said that his legal peo­
ple have told him that superintendent’s or­
ders are not the proper way to implement 
snowmobile regulations (as well as some oth­
ers) and that’s why he is working on the 
regulations package that includes the snow­
mobile closure.” Here, the threat of a super­
intendent’s unbridled discretion hovers over 
the managem ent process. The ASSA article 
raises an early concern about the superinten­
dent overstepping his institutional authority.
The ASSA continues to press the issue of 
institutional authority in their response to the 
temporary regulations issued in February 
1999, further raising questions about the le­
gitimacy of the Park Service and their deci­
sion-making procedures. They placed a copy 
of the NPS announcem ent of the regulation 
on their website and responded point-by- 
point to a num ber of passages, and also pro­
vided a link to a form letter that could be 
emailed to the Superintendent. The response 
directly challenges the NPS claim that the 
Old Park has never been open to snowmo­
biles, using statutory justification to support 
their argument. The ASSA states that 
ANILCA “addressed snowmobiles, affirm­
ing the right to use them in ‘back country’ 
areas (a designation given to the original 
M ount McKinley National Park).” Then, 
they contrast this statutory justification with 
the questionable foundation of the tem po­
rary regulations: “W hat has happened is the
Denali staff has prohibited snowmobile use 
in this area through a ‘Superintendants [sic] 
O rder,’ which is on shaky ground from a 
legal standpoint.” This contrast marks an im ­
portant shift in the pattern of argument, as 
they turn away from the continuity or con­
sistency of the policy itself and begin to ques­
tion the institutional, authority exercised to 
promulgate the regulations.
Arguments about institutional authority 
are the basis not only of the ASSA lawsuit 
challenging the regulations; interestingly, 
they also are at the heart of the Wilderness 
Society’s own lawsuit against the NPS and 
their motion opposing the ASSA suit. For 
the ASSA, the tem porary regulations are too 
restrictive; for the Wilderness Society, the 
regulations are not restrictive enough. These 
positions on motorized access, however, 
eventually get translated into arguments 
about institutional authority during the 
course of clarifying the policy. Just as the 
ASSA argues that the superintendent does 
not have the authority to close areas to snow­
mobile use, the Wilderness Society argues 
that the NPS does not have authority to keep 
open two narrow corridors for snowmobile 
use in the Old Park. Thus, both advocacy 
groups use the ANILCA legislation to chal­
lenge Park Service decisions that appear to 
overstep the boundary between statutory 
m andate and agency discretion. Arguments 
about snowmobiles get rearticulated as argu­
ments about institutions.
T he D istrict Court O pin ion
It is not surprising, then, that institutional 
arguments provide the ultimate basis for the 
District Court opinion that rem anded the 
agency’s decision on regulations to the Sec­
retary of the Interior. This interpretation of 
the court’s opinion differs from the interpre­
tation offered in newspaper accounts of the 
decision, which claim that the court’s opin­
ion was based on a definitional issue: the 
Park Service’s failure to define the phrase
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“traditional activities.” Although the NPS 
did not define that phrase clearly, an analysis 
of the opinion shows that arguments about 
institutional authority serve as grounds for the 
definitional arguments and thus provide the 
ultimate rationale for the court’s decision. 
Institutional arguments justify the accep­
tance or rejection of a particular definition.
The court’s opinion identifies the Secre­
tary of the Interior as having the institutional 
authority to determine the appropriate defi­
nition of “traditional activities.” The opinion 
begins by disposing arguments that the court 
should examine the legislative history of 
ANILCA to determine the legality of the 
snowmobile ban: “O f course, as Justice Sca- 
lia has observed, it is the language of statutes, 
not the language of legislative history, which 
is enacted as law by Congress. Here, where 
Congress failed to define ‘traditional activi­
ties’ in ANILCA, Congress did include a 
statutory authorization empowering the Sec­
retary to adopt regulations necessary to carry 
out the law” v. Babbitt 7). In this pas­
sage, the court clarifies the delegation of au­
thority from Congress to the administrative 
agency, which gives the Secretary authority 
to make regulations to execute the law. 
Thus, the opinion invokes an argument 
about institutional authority that allows the 
court to situate the resolution of definitional 
questions within a specific governing institu­
tion.
Resituating the definitional question in 
this way allows the court to establish a 
straightforward definitional argument based 
on the words of the Secretary. The opinion 
turns to the 1986 Denali regulations in which 
the Secretary argues that there is no statutory 
support in ANILCA for banning snowmo­
biles in the O ld Park. Thus, the opinion 
relies on the prior arguments of the control­
ling institutional authority to determine the 
definition that applies in this instance. R e­
gardless of the definitions that are possible, 
the Secretary’s definition is determinative: 
“Although the Secretary might have defined
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traditional activities in the m anner suggested 
by Wilderness Society-the court does not 
now decide w hether such an interpretation 
could be consistent with A N ILC A -the Sec­
retary has not done so. U nder these circum­
stances, this court rejects Wilderness Soci­
ety’s argument. It follows that the Decision 
violates ANILCA for the reason previously 
explained” (9). In  other words, the Secre­
tary’s earlier interpretation found no statu­
tory support for a ban, and thus the court is 
obligated to follow the Secretary’s earlier 
interpretation of the statute as definitive. By 
appealing to the earlier argument of the con­
trolling authority, the court finds that the 
temporary regulations of February 1999 vi­
olate ANILCA.
Thus, it is not solely a definitional argu­
ment that grounded the court’s decision. The 
definitional argument is em bedded within a 
determination of whose definition and inter­
pretation of the statute has authority. In this 
case, the Secretary’s definition, ascertained 
through analysis of previous regulations, de­
termines the court’s judgm ent about the new 
regulations. Since the ruling, the Park Ser­
vice has drafted new regulations that address 
the definitional problem  surrounding “tradi­
tional activities.” Nonetheless, these key def­
initional assertions must come from the ap­
propriate institutional authority in order to 
have rhetorical and legal force. In these 
cases about motorized access to wilderness, 
then, arguments about institutional authority 
have rhetorical primacy over arguments 
about definitions.
T h e  P r im a c y  o f  I n s t it u t io n a l  
A r g u m e n t s : T h e o r e t ic a l  a n d  
P r a c t ic a l  I m p l ic a t io n s
The Boundary W aters and Denali cases 
demonstrate how  arguments about institu­
tional authority play a  crucial role in estab­
lishing definitions used in the implementa­
tion of public policy. Not only do those 
arguments help resolve definitional disputes,
I.
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but also they function to negotiate the legit­
imacy of governing institutions. The illustra­
tion of this process leads back to the theoret­
ical issues surrounding definitions, institutional 
arguments, and hegemony raised in the in­
troduction of this essay. In this section, I 
elaborate on each of these areas by discuss­
ing the importance and rhetorical effects of 
arguments about institutional authority, us­
ing examples from these cases to illustrate 
my arguments.
First, I suggested that this study contrib­
utes to argumentation scholarship by speci­
fying institutional arguments as a significant 
influence on definitions that get fixed as part 
of the policy process. The Boundary W aters 
and Denali cases described above show how 
easily arguments about the definitions of 
terms like “feasible,” “access,” and “tradi­
tional activities” are subsumed by arguments 
about institutional authority.
The importance of this influence emerges 
when we consider one of the potential rhe­
torical effects of institutional arguments. Ar­
guments about institutional authority allow the 
courts to deflect definitional questions, with the 
effect o f perpetuating political conflict over defini­
tions. Both the Boundary W aters and Denali 
cases show how a court’s deferral o f defini­
tional questions prolongs rhetorical struggle 
and moves it to other institutional sites. Take 
the case of the Boundary Waters: the A p­
peals Court’s arguments about institutional 
authority directed advocates to take their 
claims to Congress. So, advocates who found 
fault with the Appeals Court decision en­
couraged Senator Rod Grams and Represen­
tative Jim  Oberstar to hold Congressional 
field hearings and propose new legislation 
for Boundary W aters management through­
out the mid-1990s. Rather than settle a def­
initional dispute, the Court’s arguments 
about institutional authority prolonged the 
dispute and shifted it toward a different poli­
cymaking forum (Jones and Taylor 331).
This shift of forum points to the second 
issue raised at the outset of this essay. I sug­
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gested that arguments about institutional au­
thority function rhetorically to negotiate the 
legitimacy of state institutions. W hen courts 
assert that a particular institution Has the 
authority to define a term for policy pur­
poses, then questions of legitimacy emerge 
for that institution. W ith every invocation of 
an argument about institutional authority, 
the courts imply that some other part of the 
policy-making apparatus (Congress, the For­
est Service, the Park Service) should be ac­
cepted as the rightful definer of key terms. 
However, this acceptance is based not only 
on the court’s assertion of definitional au­
thority; whether that authority will be ac­
cepted as legitimate depends upon the 
broader public perception of the institution. 
Thus, we can note a second im portant rhe­
torical effect of institutional arguments. By 
focusing on who should define the term 
rather than on the definition itself, arguments 
about institutional authority raise the issue o f an 
institution’s legitimacy.
The Boundary W aters and Denali cases 
are especially useful for discussing the rela­
tionship between institutional arguments 
and legitimacy because they show how insti­
tutional arguments can have divergent, un­
even effects on the legitimacy of governing 
institutions. In that regard, the cases provide 
a useful counterpoint to Doxtader’s claim 
that institutional justifications shut down 
conflict in order to preserve institutional sta­
bility. As he puts it, “Justificatory arguments 
are sites where the interests o f the public and 
the institutional-instrumental process of sta­
bility maintenance m e e t . . . .  Critique shows 
how institutions collapse the relational ele­
ments of justificatory argument into a self- 
perpetuating argument form that reifies pro­
cesses of public interest formation in the 
name of pre-given norms of stability” (197). 
Although a governing institution justifies its 
decisions in order to stabilize relationships 
between citizens and the institution, the wil­
derness access cases reveal that institutional
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arguments m ay stabilize some institutions 
but can destabilize others.
For example, in these cases arguments 
about institutional authority allow the courts 
to bolster their legitimacy. W hen courts side­
step definitional questions in favor of argu­
ments about institutional authority, they can 
avoid the appearance of being “active”; de­
ferral to agency definitions allows the courts 
to appear that they are not legislating from 
the bench. Creating this appearance is im ­
portant for the courts in light of criticisms 
that courts have squashed administrative dis­
cretion in reviewing agency decisions (for 
criticisms see Rabkin, Shapiro; for a defense, 
see Clayton). So, even as the courts engage 
in definitional arguments to support agency 
interpretations or to specify Congressional 
intent, their ultimate arguments about insti­
tutional authority function to show that the 
court is not overstepping its bounds. Argu­
ments that focus on institutional authority 
can help the courts appear as if they are not 
actively intervening in agency decisionmak­
ing or creating their own definitions of stat­
utory terms. Thus, by subsuming definitional 
questions within arguments about institu­
tional authority, courts can minimize the ap­
pearance of actively imposing their own pol­
icy preferences and bolster their legitimacy.4
For other institutions, however, the defer­
ral of definitional questions back to Congress 
or the agencies raises the issue of the legiti­
macy of those institutions. As suggested 
above, public acceptance of an institution’s 
definitional authority depends on whether 
that institution is seen as legitimate. In both
4 In other instances, judicial opinions can bolster legit­
im acy by channeling dissent out o f institutional arenas. 
This is uie case when arguments about institutional au­
thority focus not on which institution has the authority to 
establish a  definition, but on w hether institutions should 
have the pow er to define. Schiappa (2000) illustrates this 
in his analysis o f constitutional disputes over abortion, 
showing how  Justice O ’C onnor’s opinions have argued 
that the “m eaning” of a  pre-viability abortion is best left 
to individual wom en rather than state institutions. By 
delegating definitional authority back into civil society, 
the courts rely on an implicit appeal to “the people” to 
further bolster their legitimacy.
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the Boundary W aters and Denali cases, for 
example, public acceptance of an agency’s 
definition hinged on the perception of those 
agencies as adhering to the mandates of 
Congress (in the Boundary Waters) and 
making decisions that were not merely per­
sonal preference of agency personnel (in De­
nali). These perceptions of legitimacy are 
brought into the foreground when courts 
claim that a particular institution has author­
ity to establish definitions. Hence, arguments 
about institutional authority need to be as­
sessed with regard to the range of potential 
effects on governing institutions. Institu­
tional arguments do not necessarily shore up 
the stability of institutions; they may 
heighten the legitimacy of one institution, 
and bring another institution’s legitimacy 
problems into sharp relief.
These divergent and uneven effects of in­
stitutional arguments on legitimacy are in­
structive for the study of hegemony and the 
role of the rhetoric of state institutions in the 
formation of consent, the third issue raised at 
the outset of this essay. Specifically, the diver­
gent effects o f institutional arguments on legiti­
macy make those arguments especially useful for 
examining the role that state institutions play in 
the constitution o f hegemony. The implications I 
have already drawn show how institutional 
arguments are productive of both consent 
and dissent. To the extent that arguments 
about institutional authority generate some 
degree of adherence to state institutions, 
whether through unspoken agreement or the 
ongoing disagreements within other institu­
tional forums, it may be argued that these 
arguments are productive of consent to state 
institutions. That is, participation in or acqui­
escence to the policy process may be taken 
as a sign that a basic level of legitimacy has 
been achieved by state institutions as a 
whole. In this view, dissent is managed by 
transferring conflict from one institution to 
another, and the state continues to exercise 
hegemony over the transformation of wild­
I
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ness into “wilderness” (for an extreme form 
of this argument, see Birch).
But shifting the conflict to another institu­
tion may encourage advocates to further 
question the legitimacy of that institution. 
The courts’ arguments about institutional au­
thority draw attention to the institutions 
themselves, to whose definition should have 
authority. So, even as conflicts get trans­
ferred from one institution to the another, 
that may only reinforce negative perceptions 
of those institutions. If a court opinion 
merely ratifies the authority of an already- 
maligned agency, that ratification does little 
to bolster the agency’s legitimacy and 
heightens the sense that the agency is insu­
lated from public criticism. Further, the 
transfer of conflict from one forum to an­
other may damage the legitimacy of the state 
as a whole, if it appears that none of the 
institutions can provide a decisive definition 
or policy (Wondolleck 105-118). To the ex­
tent that arguments about institutional au­
thority provoke generalized dissatisfaction 
with state institutions, these arguments can 
generate dissent even as they attempt to dis­
place it.
Attention to how state rhetorics generate 
both consent and dissent provides an im por­
tant qualification and addition to dominant 
theorizations of hegemony within rhetorical 
scholarship. My argum ent above about the 
divergent and uneven effects of institutional 
arguments on legitimacy reinforces the com ­
mon claim that the exercise of hegemony is 
best characterized as the dynamic process of 
producing consent rather than the m ono­
lithic imposition of a dom inant ideology 
(Condit). However, producing consent does 
not only consist of forging an accommoda­
tion on substantive, definitional issues. Hege­
mony also requires the production o f  consent to the 
procedural, institutional means by which substan­
tive issues get resolved. As I have argued here 
and elsewhere, institutional arguments may 
be productive of hegemony to the extent that 
they channel further disagreement within in­
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stitutional boundaries, but they also may 
function to undercut hegemony to the extent 
that they erode the legitimacy of governing 
institutions (Schwarze). Thus, scholars con­
cerned with the rhetorical dimensions of he­
gemony would do well to include the argu­
ments of governing institutions in their 
analyses, and to address the multiple levels 
on which those arguments contribute to the 
production of consent.
This analysis of institutional arguments, 
then, suggests how studies of hegemony 
might be complemented by turning a  critical 
eye toward the rhetorics of governing insti­
tutions. So far work on hegemony within 
communication studies has tended to focus 
on civil society rhetorics.5 This focus on 
stems in part from a reading of Gramsci that 
relies on a sharp distinction between the 
State and civil society, where the term “he­
gemony” names the type of leadership exer­
cised in civil society and “domination” char­
acterizes the coercive power of the state. In 
this reading, hegemony produces consent 
among citizens; when consent dissolves, the 
State apparatus exercises domination 
through repressive force. An early passage in 
Prison Notebooks captures this distinction con­
cisely:
W h a t w e can  do, for the  m om en t, is to  fix tw o m ajor 
superstructural “ levels” : the  o n e  th a t can  b e  called 
“civil society”, th a t is the  ensem ble o f organism s 
com m only  called “private”, an d  th a t o f  “political 
society” o r  “the  S tate .” T h ese  tw o levels correspond  
o n  the  o n e  h a n d  to th e  function o f  “hegem ony” 
w hich th e  d o m in an t g roup  exercises th roughou t so­
ciety  an d  o n  th e  o th er h a n d  to th a t o f  “d irec t dom i-
5 Condit’s work on reproductive technologies analyzes 
popular magazine ana  national newspaper articles. 
Cloud develops her critique of Condit’s view of hege­
m ony via an analysis o f television and magazine biogra­
phies o f O prah  VVinfrey. Hanke and Dow examine tele­
vision shows in order to exam ine hegemonic versions of 
masculinity and femininity, respectively. A nd while 
M um by does not undertake an empirical study in his 
essay on hegem ony, he does argue that Gramsci’s atten­
tion to civil society should be emulated in future critical 
scholarship, since it “creates greater possibilities for ex­
am ining gaps and fissures in the prevailing ideology” 
(365).
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n a tio n ” o r  co m m an d  exercised  th rough  th e  S tate  an d  
“jurid ica l” g o v ern m en t (12).
This passage gets invoked by M um by (347) 
and Condit (206) to warrant the focus on 
civil society. As M um by puts it, “hegemony 
resides primarily in the realm of civil society 
(although it can be exercised also by the 
State)” (348). In spite of this admission about 
the role of the state in producing hegemony, 
there has been little examination of that role 
within communication studies.6 Scholars 
have produced numerous studies of the he­
gemonic and counter-hegemonic rhetorics 
within civil society, but they have barely 
explored the state’s role in hegemony or 
problematized Gramsci’s explanation of the 
relationship between civil society and the 
state.
N ear the end of the Prison Notebooks, how­
ever, Gramsci explicitly links state institu­
tions to the exercise of hegemony. In  a sec­
tion on the separation of state powers, 
Gramsci suggests that each of the branches 
of the state have an important hegemonic 
function: “Naturally all three powers are also 
organs of political hegemony: 1. Legislature; 
2. Judiciary; 3. Executive” (246). Here, 
Gramsci hints that governing institutions can 
function as sites at which hegemony is exer­
cised. At these sites, the state contributes to 
hegemony not simply in the form of coer­
cion or direct domination, but by rhetori­
cally producing consent and managing dis­
sent with regard to the exercise of state 
power. W hen the courts, administrative 
agencies, and legislative bodies produce ar­
guments that define and justify public policy, 
those institutions contribute to the hege­
monic process by articulating provisional ac­
commodations on public policy and negoti­
6 T he exception to this claim is M. Linda Miller’s essay 
on how  legislative debate transform ed m any of the p u b ­
lic arguments surrounding midwifery legislation in Flor­
ida. H er essay suggests that institutional commitments 
constrain the rhetoric produced in legislative bodies; my 
essay suggests that similar sorts o f commitments con­
strain the arguments produced by courts.
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ating state legitimacy. The introduction of 
this essay intended to display a specific ex­
ample of this contribution. State institutions 
directly influence my experience of wilder­
ness, not by influencing m y perceptions of 
wilderness, or by offering a philosophical 
defense of what wilderness ought to be, but 
by determining which institution gets to de­
fine the terms by which practical, material 
management decisions are made. By exam ­
ining these institutional arguments, then, 
rhetorical scholars can better understand the 
full range of voices that influence the opera­
tion of hegemony.
In a practical vein, the importance of in­
stitutional arguments demonstrated in this 
essay suggests that advocates can gain rhe­
torical traction by appealing to institutional 
concerns in controversies on other public 
lands. W e can already see evidence of this in 
one of the m ost notable controversies m en­
tioned at the beginning of this essay: snow­
mobile access in Yellowstone National Park. 
The W inter Use Plan for Yellowstone and 
Grand Teton National Parks, released in N o­
vem ber 2000, proposed a phased-out ban on 
snowmobiles in those parks by the winter of 
2003-2004. Even before the plan was re­
leased, advocates employed institutional ar­
guments to raise concerns about the legiti­
macy of the agency’s Plan. For example, 
Representative Barbara Cubin (R-WY) 
claimed that the Park Service failed to in­
clude the public in planning and fulfill other 
institutional responsibilities as required by 
law. “Throughout the process, the National 
Park Service has disregarded the views of the 
public, the application of sound science and 
the Administrative Procedures Act” (Graver, 
B l). Then in Ju n e  2001, the Departm ent of 
the Interior essentially overturned the plan, 
setding a lawsuit brought against the agency 
by the International Snowmobile Manufac­
turers Association. The settlement lifted the 
snowmobile ban and required a new envi­
ronm ental study to be completed in 2002 
(“Politics, Not Science”). As this settlement
1
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was being developed, critics complained that 
the Bush administration had inappropriately 
exercised its institutional authority, ignoring 
the Park’s extensive environmental impact 
statement and shutting out local park person­
nel from settlement discussions. In the words 
of former Yellowstone Park Superintendent 
Mike Finley: “H ad the Park been asked, we 
would have resisted setdement and sought a 
vigorous defense. W e were not asked. In 
over six and a half years at Yellowstone, I 
was involved in every major and m inor law­
suit. I was consulted  This is the first time
the opinion of the Park was not sought, or 
solicited, or considered by the administra­
tion” (Greater Yellowstone Coalition).
These arguments underscore that battles 
over access on federal lands often get fought 
at the level of institutional authority. Advo­
cates thus would do well to consider how 
arguments about institutional authority 
could be used to influence the policy pro­
cess. In particular, advocates for minimizing 
snowmobile use could benefit by emphasiz­
ing the Congressional m andate to preserve 
parks unimpaired for future generations, and 
by questioning the legitimacy of an adm in­
istration that overturns its own agency’s pol­
icy. The latter argument is especially im por­
tant in this instance, given that the NPS 
policy was based on over a decade of thor­
ough scientific studies and three years of 
public com m ent on management proposals. 
The assertion of institutional authority by the 
Secretary of the Interior in this situation 
raises serious questions about the adminis­
tration’s legitimacy.
C o n c l u s io n
My most recent wilderness excursion took 
a friend and me into the Great Bum, an area 
in the Bitterroot Mountains straddling the 
M ontana-Idaho border. This ragged maze of 
ridges, creeks and high mountain lakes was 
in the heart of the forest fires of 1910 that 
burned over 3 million acres of national for­
\VINTER 2002
ests in M ontana and Idaho. W e knew that 
the area was proposed for wilderness desig­
nation and had heard several great reports 
about the backcountry hiking there. W e 
thought it would be an ideal place for a 
weekend in the wilderness.
M y friend and I were especially disap­
pointed, then, when we arrived at Fish Lake. 
After a dem anding hike that took us along 
the M ontana-Idaho border ridge and chal­
lenged us with several ascents and descents, 
we looked forward to a quiet, relaxing 
evening by a remote wilderness lake. In­
stead, as we descended into Fish Lake we 
were greeted by what we thought at first 
were chain saws. But as we got closer, it was 
apparent that the sounds were coming from 
all-terrain vehicles. W e were no longer in the 
backcountry; we were in ATV-Land.
This affected our “wilderness” experience 
in several ways. The constant ATV traffic 
past our campsite and the random  start-up of 
the machines eliminated the possibility for 
uninterrupted, quiet solitude, which was why 
I took the trip in the first place. Further, even 
in the middle of another dry summer, the 
hiking trails are packed relatively hard and 
create negligible amounts of dust. But at the 
point where our trail met the trail being used 
by AT Vs, the soil turned into a fine dust that 
hung in the air and on the trees, and quickly 
became a part of our meal and our sleeping 
bags. Most of all, it ruined what was other­
wise a great day. It was disappointing to 
work that hard, get ten miles into the back- 
country, and then have to deal with an un­
expected, unwanted intrusion.
It is easy to dismiss these concerns as spe­
cial pleading from a backpacker who wants 
to have the wilderness all to himself, who 
believes that some forms of recreation are 
“better” than others, and who simply wants 
his way. To be sure, there are good philo­
sophical and environmental arguments that 
support the complete elimination of m otor­
ized access in wilderness areas. But those 
arguments are not necessary here. Even my
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friend, a  great outdoorsman but certainly not 
someone who identifies himself as an envi­
ronmentalist, openly expressed his disap­
pointment about the experience. In this sit­
uation, it is less a matter of philosophy than 
a matter of expectations, a certain trust that 
the Forest Service will manage public lands 
in accordance with the law.
This failure to manage in accordance with 
law erodes the legitimacy of the Forest Ser­
vice and connects this case to the problems I 
have already outlined with management in 
the Boundary W aters and Denali. In the case 
of the Great Bum, the problem  again stems 
from a definitional issue and an issue of in­
stitutional authority. The Great Bum area is 
managed by two different National Forests, 
the Lolo NF on the M ontana side and the 
Clearwater NF on the Idaho side. Each For­
est is legally required to manage in accor­
dance with its Forest Plan (the official man­
agement document, revised every 10-15 
years). O n both the Lolo and the Clearwater, 
Forest Service personnel are directed to 
manage large portions of the Great Bum  
(including the Fish Lake area) as wilderness 
until a statutory decision is made about the 
area. The plans direct the Forest Service to 
“protect the wilderness character of p ro­
posed wilderness areas until Congress makes 
classification decisions” (Clark). Not surpris­
ingly, the phrase “wilderness character” is 
open to definitional dispute, and the two 
Forests have operationally defined this 
phrase in contrasting ways. O n the Lolo, 
protecting wilderness character means ex­
cluding motorized use, while on the Clear­
water managers have allowed motorized use 
in proposed wilderness. Given these con­
trasting exercises of agency discretion, three 
environmental groups have filed suit to pro­
hibit motorized access on areas proposed as 
wilderness on the Clearwater, arguing that 
the Clearwater’s management practices have 
degraded the area’s “wilderness character.”
As in the other wilderness access cases, 
one can anticipate that the decision about
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the Great Bum  will turn on arguments about 
which institution has authority to define “wil­
derness character.” W hether that authority 
lies at the Forest level, with the Chief of the 
Forest Service, or with Congress and its def­
inition in the Wilderness Act, my excursion 
into the Great Bum  made it all too clear that 
the placem ent of definitional authority has a 
significant effect on what might ultimately 
pass for wilderness. Merely passing across a 
state border, from one National Forest into 
an adjacent Forest, fundamentally altered 
the character of wilderness. That experience 
reinforced the underlying assumption of this 
essay: arguments about institutional author­
ity offer a fruitful area for research, not only 
for the purpose of advancing theories of ar­
gumentation and hegemony, but also for the 
purpose of preparing public advocates to 
engage and criticize hegemonic accommo­
dations produced by state institutions.
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